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Finance and Economics;Equity markets;Shares and shibboleths;
財經;股票市場;股票與市場準則;
How much should people get paid for investing in the stockmarket?
人們在股票市場上的投資應該得到多少回報?
If there is a sacred belief among investors, it is that equities are the best asset for the long run. Buy a diversified portfolio, be patient and rewards will come. Holding cash or government bonds may offer safety in the short term but leaves the investor at risk from inflation over longer periods.
如果說投資者心中有個神聖的信念的話,那就是他們認為從長遠來看股票是最好的資產。 買一個多元化投資組合,課以時日,就會得到回報。 持有現金或政府債券在短期內也許更保險,但從長期來看它會讓投資者面臨通脹的風險。
Such beliefs sit oddly with the performance of the Tokyo stockmarket, which peaked at the end of 1989 and is still 75% below its high. Over the 30 years ending in 2010, a “long run” by any standards, American equities beat government bonds by less than a percentage point a year.
這種信念卻神奇地與東京股票市場的表現相吻合,該股票市場在1989年末達到最高值,並且現在仍然是其1989年最高值的75%。 從1970年到2010年這30年間,依據人們所謂“長期”的標準,美國政府債券年回報都比股票要少一個百分點。
In the developed world, the period since the turn of the millennium has been a particular disappointment. Since the end of 1999 the return on American equities has been 7.6 percentage points a year lower than that on government bonds (see chart 1). That has left many corporate and public pension funds in deficit and many people with private pensions facing a delayed, or poorer, retirement. Understanding why equities have let investors down over the past decade will help them work out what to expect in the future.
在發達國家,自進入千禧年以來， 股市令人特別失望。 自從1999年年末起,美國股票回報為7.6個百分點,低於政府債券的回報。 這導致許多企業和公共養老基金出現赤字而且許多私募養老金面臨要麼延期發放,要麼發得更少,要麼退休的境地。 理解為什麼股票在過去的十年間讓投資者失望將有助於他們認識到對未來股市的期望是什麼。
The long-term faith in equities is based on the theory that investors should be rewarded for the riskiness of shares with a higher return, known as the “equity risk premium” (ERP)。 That risk comes in two forms. The first is that shareholders get paid only when other claimants on a company’s cashflow, such as workers, the taxman and creditors, have received their due. Profits and dividends are thus highly variable and can disappear altogether when times get tough. The second risk is that share prices are volatile, more so than bond prices. Since 1926 there have been seven calendar years when American equity investors have suffered a loss of more than 20%; investors in Treasuries have suffered no such calamitous years.
對股票的長期信心是基於這樣一個理論， 投資者在投資有風險的股票時應該得到高額回報,即股票風險溢價(ERP)。 股票風險源於兩個方面。 第一種是只有當掌控一個公司資金流轉的人， 如工人,稅務稽查員和債權人的得到他們應得的收益後,最後股東才能得到回報。
The big question, however, is how large that extra return should be. Here it is important to distinguish between the extra return investors actually achieved for holding equities (what could be called the ex post number) and the return they expected to achieve when they bought them (the ex ante figure). Academics started to focus on this problem in the mid-1980s when a paper by Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott indicated that the ex post return of American equity investors had been remarkably high, at around seven percentage points a year. It seems unlikely that investors expected to do so well.
然而,最大問題是股票投資者得到的額外收益有多高才合理?區分額外收益投資者實際能從他們所持有的股票(即事後估計值)得到的回報以及當他們買入股票時期望得到的回報(即事前估計值)是至關重要的。 從20世紀80年代中期學術界就開始關注這個問題。 那時Rajnish Mehra 和 Edward Prescott就在論文中指出美國股票投資者的事後估計值總是出奇地高,每年約有7個百分點。
Premium puzzle
溢價之謎
There are a number of possible explanations for these very high ex post returns. One is survivorship bias in the numbers. America, which is the benchmark for ERP measurements, turned out to be the most successful economy of the 20th century, but it might not have been. Before the first world war investors doubtless had high hopes for Argentina, China or Russia—only to be disappointed.
對於如此高額的事後估計收益有種種解釋。 一種是倖存者偏差。 作為股票風險溢價測量方法的基準的美國,被證明是20世紀最成功的經濟體,但這一切已經不復存在。 在第一次世界大戰之前對阿根廷,中國或俄羅斯抱很大希望的投資者沒想到會失望。
Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton of the London Business School (LBS) have analysed the data for 19 countries from 1900 to 2011 and found that the ERP relative to Treasury bills (short-term government debt) ranged from just over two-and-a-half percentage points a year in Denmark to six-and-a-half points in Australia. They found a premium for America of five percentage points.
倫敦商學院的Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh和Mike Staunton對19個國家從1900年到2011年的資料進行分析後發現,股票風險溢價相對於短期無息國庫券(短期政府債務)相比的收益範圍從丹麥的每年2.5個百分點到澳大利亞的每年6.5個百分點不等。 美國的溢價是5個百分點。
Another explanation for the high returns is a paradoxical one: that equities have become less risky. In the early part of the 20th century corporate accounts were more opaque and less reliable (though shareholders in Enron, a bust energy company, may disagree). Most stocks were owned by private investors with only a handful of individual shares. This left them more exposed to the risk of a single firm failing, which meant they put a lower value on shares—or, to put it another way, they demanded a higher premium for owning them.
而另一種對高收益的解釋卻和第一種相互矛盾:股票的風險在降低。 20世紀初期企業帳目更加不透明而且可靠程度更低(雖然對於已經破產的能源公司-安然的股東也許不同意這種看法)。
Today most equities are owned by institutional investors who can assemble a diversified portfolio. Even small investors can own an index fund at low cost. The impact of one company failing is thus far smaller. This reduced risk has prompted investors to pay higher prices for shares; in other words, to accept a lower dividend yield. That may well have increased the ex post risk premium (other things being equal, a fall in the dividend yield from 4% to 2% means investors double their money).
如今大部分股票被機構投資者所持有。 這些投資者以多樣化組合進行投資。 即使是小投資者也能以較低的成本持有指數基金。 這樣受某個公司破產的影響也就很小了。 風險的降低也促使投資者高價投資股票。 換而言之， 投資者要接受一個較低的股息收益率。 這樣也許會增加事後估計風險酬金的增加。 (在其它條件相同的情況下， 股息收益率從4%跌到2%意味著投資者要投雙倍的錢)。
The size and persistence of the ERP led some commentators in the late 1990s to come up with an ingenious, if flawed, argument. In their book “Dow 36,000”, for instance, James Glassman and Kevin Hassett argued that the reliable outperformance of shares over bonds meant that equities were not riskier at all. As a result, there need be no ex ante risk premium.
股票風險溢價的規模及持續性使得一些時事評論員在20世紀90年代末提出了一個巧妙而有缺陷的論點。 在《道鐘斯指數36000點》一書中， James Glassman 和Kevin Hassett認為， 股票優於債券的出色表現意味著股票根本沒有風險。 因此不需要事前風險溢價。
This time is not different
今非昔比
If this belief were correct, equity investors should have been willing to accept a lower earnings yield. (This is the inverse of the price-earnings ratio; if the p/e is 50, the earnings yield is 2%.) In the course of moving to the lower earnings yield, the market would have soared to the 36,000 level of the book’s title. A lower ex ante risk premium implies higher returns in the short term. The authors were proved right in one sense. Investors who bought shares in 1999 did not earn a risk premium. But that will be of scant consolation to those who believed the book, since 13 years later the Dow is at around 13,000, not 36,000.
如果這種觀點是正確的， 股票投資者應該願意接受較低的盈利收益。 (這是逆向市盈率， 如果市盈率達到50， 那麼收益率為2%)。 在盈利收益走低的情況下， 股票市場一路飆升到書中標題所說的36， 000點。 較低的事前評價風險溢價往往意味著短期內較高的回報。 某種程度上作者的觀點被證明是正確的。 在1999年購買股票的投資者並沒賺到風險溢價。 但這對那些推崇這本書的人來說， 顯然缺少安慰。因為13年後，道指僅為13，000點左右，遠不是書中所說的36，000點。
One obvious problem with their reasoning was that, although equities might have beaten bonds over most long periods, the horizon of the average investor is much shorter. There have been many equity bear markets in history and investors are exposed to the real risk that they will have to sell in the middle of one. Most shares are owned by professional fund managers, who have to report to their clients every three months. If a big bet on equities goes wrong they cannot wait 20 years to be proved right. Clients will have deserted them long before then.
按照他們的推斷，一個顯而易見的問題出現了，儘管在較長的週期內股票的收益可能已經超過了債券，但普通投資者卻越來越目光短淺。史上曾出現過多次熊市但投資者們面臨的風險是他們不得不在中間價位拋售手中的股票。那些每三個月向他們的客戶彙報股市行情的基金經理持有大量股票。如果大筆賭注投在股票上而虧了，用不了他們等待20年來證明是正確的，客戶早就會把他們拋棄。
The late-1990s debate illustrated a familiar pattern at the top of bull markets. When share prices have already risen a lot, commentators scramble for reasons why they should rise even further. In the 1980s those who queried whether the Japanese stockmarket was expensive on a minimal dividend yield and a sky-high price-earnings ratio were told that “Western valuation methods” did not apply in Tokyo. At the turn of the century many assumed that, because the achieved ERP had been high in the past, it would be so in the future. But investors had their reasoning backwards. When share valuations are high, future returns are likely to be low and vice versa.
20世紀90年代末的爭論證明了牛市見頂的一個熟悉模式。當股價大幅上漲時，時事評論員東拼西湊各種理由來解釋為什麼股價上漲甚至會漲得更多。在20世紀80年代那些質疑以極低的股息收益率和極高的市盈率的日本股市是否昂貴的人被告之“西方的計價方法並不適合東京股票市場”。在世紀之交許多假設都認為是這樣，因為已經兌現的股票風險溢價在過去收益很高，在未來也是如此。但是投資者自己分析認為這一情況將會改變。當股票價值高漲時，未來的收益就可能偏低。反之亦然。
Given the history of the risk premium, what will the future reward for equity investors be? This question is discussed in a new set of papers* issued by the Chartered Financial Analysts Institute. The collection is a follow-up to a similar exercise undertaken in 2001, where the range of estimates of the premium varied from zero to seven percentage points a year.
從風險溢價的歷史來看，股票投資者未來的收益將會是什麼呢?最近由特許金融分析師學會發表的論文中多次討論到這個問題。論文中收集到的資料是基於2001年發生的相同交易，估計每年的股票溢價範圍在0到7個百分點之間。
The first step is to define the equity risk premium more exactly. Mssrs Dimson, Marsh and Staunton break it down into the following components: the dividend yield, plus the real dividend growth rate, plus or minus any change in the price/dividend ratio (the inverse of the dividend yield), minus the real risk-free interest rate.
第一步是盡可能精確地界定股票風險溢價的範疇。Mssrs Dimson,Marsh和Staunton將股票風險溢價分成以下幾個部分:股息收益率加上實際股息成長率,加上或減去價格與股息之比率(股息收益率的倒數)中的變動值,最後再減去實際無風險利率。
In the period 1900-2011, the average world dividend yield was 4.1%; real dividend growth was just 0.8%; and the rerating of the market added 0.4%。 That comes to a real equity return of 5.4% (the calculation is geometric, not arithmetic)。 Stripping out the risk-free interest rate, the ERP was 4.4% versus short-term government debt and 3.5% versus longer-term government bonds (see chart 2).
從1900年到2011年,世界平均股息收益率為4.1%。實際股息增長率僅為0.8%。加上0.4%的市場重估價值就構成5.4%的實際股票收益。(此計算結果為幾何級數演算法,未按算數式來計算)。除去無風險利率,與短期政府債券相比,股票風險溢價為4.4%。和長期政府債券相比,股票風險溢價為3.5%。
The dividend yield comprised the vast bulk of the return. This was true across all the countries studied by the authors. Had investors consistently bought the highest-yielding quintile of equity markets over the past 112 years they would have earned an average nominal annual return of 13.3% compared with a return of just 5.4% for those buying the lowest-yielding quintile. High-dividend markets have also performed best so far this century.
股息收益率包括高額回報。這是作者經過對許多國家的研究後證實的。與在收益率最低的15年內投資者在其購買股票後的年收益率僅為5.4%相比,投資者在過去112年中收益率最高的15年內持續購買股票後的平均名義年收益率為13.3%。到本世紀為止,高股息市場的發展最為迅猛。
The importance of the dividend yield is ironic, given the lack of focus on the measure in most modern investment commentary. Many analysts argue that the dividend has been superseded by the share buy-back which (particularly in America) is a more tax-efficient way of returning cash to shareholders. But Robert Arnott of Research Affiliates points out that, although buy-backs reduce share capital, companies are also finding ways to add to it. Firms issue shares to pay for acquisitions, for example, or to reward executives through incentive schemes. Historically, net share issuance has been around 2% of total equity capital a year. This dilution of existing shareholders is part of the reason why real dividend growth has been so low, well below GDP growth.
股息收益率的重要性卻頗具諷刺意味,很多現代投資評論很少關注如何衡量股息收益率。許多分析家認為,股息已被股票回購所取代(特別是在美國),這是一種向股東返還現金而且更加節稅的辦法。但是研究機構的Robert Arnott指出,儘管回購會減少股本金,公司仍可以找到辦法來增加它。 例如，公司通過發行股份以支付收購所需的資金，或通過激勵措施來回報高管。從歷史上看，一年的淨股票發行已經達到總股本的2%左右。為什麼真正的股息增長已經如此之低，遠遠低於GDP的增長，其一部分原因是減少現有股東的持股。
As a starting point for estimating the future ERP, this is not encouraging. The current dividend yield on stockmarkets is lower (at 2.7% in the countries covered by the LBS data) than the historical average. Dividends tend to grow (at best) no faster than GDP, and usually slower because of the dilution effect. Nor is there much hope of a boost from a revaluation of the market. Since the yield is low, relative to history, it is more likely that any revaluation will subtract from returns. In another paper, Cliff Asness of AQR Capital, a hedge-fund group, uses his estimates of dividend yield and likely dividend growth to come up with a forecast for future real equity returns in America of around 4% a year.
作為估計未來股票風險溢價的起點,這並不讓人歡欣鼓舞。股市目前的股息收益率(在LBS資料覆蓋的國家,股息收益率為2.7%)低於歷史平均水準。在最好的情況下,股息收益率也不如GDP增長快。通常增長緩慢是由於稀釋作用的影響。不要對市場的重新評估所帶來對股市的推動抱有太大希望。和以往相比,現在的收益率偏低,任何重新評估的推動力很可能從收益中剔除。 AQR資本管理公司(它是對沖基金公司)的Cliff Asness在另一篇文章中，利用他們對股息收益率和可能的股息增長的估計，預測出美國未來每年4%左右實際的股權回報。
Future imperfect
不太美妙的未來
Although this figure is lower than the historical average, it still means that equity investors will earn a risk premium. The real yields on short- and long-term debt are zero, or negative in some cases. Nominal yields are close to historic lows. If the risk-free return is zero, then the entire return from equities will count as a risk premium. And a 4% premium would be only a little below the long-term average for America.
儘管這一資料低於歷史平均水準，但仍意味著股票投資者能獲得風險溢價。短期或長期債券的收益率為零，或在某些情況下是負數。名義收益率接近歷史最低水準。如果無風險收益為零，那麼全部股票收益將被當作風險溢價。並且4%的溢價僅比美國歷史平均水準略低。
That still would not be high enough for many pension funds. In America, local-government pension funds base their contributions on the assumption that they will earn 8% (in nominal terms) on their investment portfolios. Treasury bonds yield 2% at the moment, so a 4% risk premium suggests a nominal return of 6% on equities. That means pension funds will fall well short of their targeted return.
對於許多養老基金來講，這4%的溢價仍不算高。在美國，當地政府養老基金是建立在他們在投資組合中將獲得8%(名義收益)的收益的假設基礎之上的。同期的國債收益為2%，因此4%的風險溢價意味著6%的股權名義回報。這就意味著養老基金遠沒達到它的目標回報。
Pension providers have two options: increase contributions or cut benefits. Cutting benefits will be difficult for many American states since pension rights are legally or constitutionally guaranteed. So taxes will have to go up or other services will have to be cut. Companies that have offered pensions linked to final salaries may have to divert money into their pension schemes, cash that could have been invested to boost the economy. Individuals who rely on private pensions (or on so-called defined-contribution benefits, where the company does not promise a payout) face the same problem.
提供養老金的人有兩種選擇：要麼增加捐款，要麼削減福利。削減福利對於大部分美國的州來講非常困難，因為養老金領取權是合法的或者受憲法保障的。所以不得不在稅收上削減或者將其它服務削減。提供與最終薪金相關的養老金的公司不得不把它們原本投資用來刺激經濟的錢轉投到養老金計畫中。依賴私人養老金的個人(或依賴所謂的養老金固定繳納計畫，而公司不承擔支付的人)面臨同樣的問題。
Equities are not a miracle asset that will turn measly contributions into a generous pension. Those who want to retire in comfort should save more.
股票不是一種可將微薄的捐款轉化成豐厚的養老金的神奇資產。那些想要在退休後頤養天年的人應該更加節儉。
顯然缺少安慰。因為13年後，道指僅為13，000點左右，遠不是書中所說的36，000點。One obvious problem with their reasoning was that, although equities might have beaten bonds over most long periods, the horizon of the average investor is much shorter. There have been many equity bear markets in history and investors are exposed to the real risk that they will have to sell in the middle of one. Most shares are owned by professional fund managers, who have to report to their clients every three months. If a big bet on equities goes wrong they cannot wait 20 years to be proved right. Clients will have deserted them long before then.
按照他們的推斷，一個顯而易見的問題出現了，儘管在較長的週期內股票的收益可能已經超過了債券，但普通投資者卻越來越目光短淺。史上曾出現過多次熊市但投資者們面臨的風險是他們不得不在中間價位拋售手中的股票。那些每三個月向他們的客戶彙報股市行情的基金經理持有大量股票。如果大筆賭注投在股票上而虧了，用不了他們等待20年來證明是正確的，客戶早就會把他們拋棄。
The late-1990s debate illustrated a familiar pattern at the top of bull markets. When share prices have already risen a lot, commentators scramble for reasons why they should rise even further. In the 1980s those who queried whether the Japanese stockmarket was expensive on a minimal dividend yield and a sky-high price-earnings ratio were told that “Western valuation methods” did not apply in Tokyo. At the turn of the century many assumed that, because the achieved ERP had been high in the past, it would be so in the future. But investors had their reasoning backwards. When share valuations are high, future returns are likely to be low and vice versa.
20世紀90年代末的爭論證明了牛市見頂的一個熟悉模式。當股價大幅上漲時，時事評論員東拼西湊各種理由來解釋為什麼股價上漲甚至會漲得更多。在20世紀80年代那些質疑以極低的股息收益率和極高的市盈率的日本股市是否昂貴的人被告之“西方的計價方法並不適合東京股票市場”。在世紀之交許多假設都認為是這樣，因為已經兌現的股票風險溢價在過去收益很高，在未來也是如此。但是投資者自己分析認為這一情況將會改變。當股票價值高漲時，未來的收益就可能偏低。反之亦然。
Given the history of the risk premium, what will the future reward for equity investors be? This question is discussed in a new set of papers* issued by the Chartered Financial Analysts Institute. The collection is a follow-up to a similar exercise undertaken in 2001, where the range of estimates of the premium varied from zero to seven percentage points a year.
從風險溢價的歷史來看，股票投資者未來的收益將會是什麼呢?最近由特許金融分析師學會發表的論文中多次討論到這個問題。論文中收集到的資料是基於2001年發生的相同交易，估計每年的股票溢價範圍在0到7個百分點之間。
The first step is to define the equity risk premium more exactly. Mssrs Dimson, Marsh and Staunton break it down into the following components: the dividend yield, plus the real dividend growth rate, plus or minus any change in the price/dividend ratio (the inverse of the dividend yield), minus the real risk-free interest rate.
第一步是盡可能精確地界定股票風險溢價的範疇。Mssrs Dimson,Marsh和Staunton將股票風險溢價分成以下幾個部分:股息收益率加上實際股息成長率,加上或減去價格與股息之比率(股息收益率的倒數)中的變動值,最後再減去實際無風險利率。
In the period 1900-2011, the average world dividend yield was 4.1%; real dividend growth was just 0.8%; and the rerating of the market added 0.4%。 That comes to a real equity return of 5.4% (the calculation is geometric, not arithmetic)。 Stripping out the risk-free interest rate, the ERP was 4.4% versus short-term government debt and 3.5% versus longer-term government bonds (see chart 2).
從1900年到2011年,世界平均股息收益率為4.1%。實際股息增長率僅為0.8%。加上0.4%的市場重估價值就構成5.4%的實際股票收益。(此計算結果為幾何級數演算法,未按算數式來計算)。除去無風險利率,與短期政府債券相比,股票風險溢價為4.4%。和長期政府債券相比,股票風險溢價為3.5%。
The dividend yield comprised the vast bulk of the return. This was true across all the countries studied by the authors. Had investors consistently bought the highest-yielding quintile of equity markets over the past 112 years they would have earned an average nominal annual return of 13.3% compared with a return of just 5.4% for those buying the lowest-yielding quintile. High-dividend markets have also performed best so far this century.
股息收益率包括高額回報。這是作者經過對許多國家的研究後證實的。與在收益率最低的15年內投資者在其購買股票後的年收益率僅為5.4%相比,投資者在過去112年中收益率最高的15年內持續購買股票後的平均名義年收益率為13.3%。到本世紀為止,高股息市場的發展最為迅猛。
The importance of the dividend yield is ironic, given the lack of focus on the measure in most modern investment commentary. Many analysts argue that the dividend has been superseded by the share buy-back which (particularly in America) is a more tax-efficient way of returning cash to shareholders. But Robert Arnott of Research Affiliates points out that, although buy-backs reduce share capital, companies are also finding ways to add to it. Firms issue shares to pay for acquisitions, for example, or to reward executives through incentive schemes. Historically, net share issuance has been around 2% of total equity capital a year. This dilution of existing shareholders is part of the reason why real dividend growth has been so low, well below GDP growth.
股息收益率的重要性卻頗具諷刺意味,很多現代投資評論很少關注如何衡量股息收益率。許多分析家認為,股息已被股票回購所取代(特別是在美國),這是一種向股東返還現金而且更加節稅的辦法。但是研究機構的Robert Arnott指出,儘管回購會減少股本金,公司仍可以找到辦法來增加它。 例如，公司通過發行股份以支付收購所需的資金，或通過激勵措施來回報高管。從歷史上看，一年的淨股票發行已經達到總股本的2%左右。為什麼真正的股息增長已經如此之低，遠遠低於GDP的增長，其一部分原因是減少現有股東的持股。
As a starting point for estimating the future ERP, this is not encouraging. The current dividend yield on stockmarkets is lower (at 2.7% in the countries covered by the LBS data) than the historical average. Dividends tend to grow (at best) no faster than GDP, and usually slower because of the dilution effect. Nor is there much hope of a boost from a revaluation of the market. Since the yield is low, relative to history, it is more likely that any revaluation will subtract from returns. In another paper, Cliff Asness of AQR Capital, a hedge-fund group, uses his estimates of dividend yield and likely dividend growth to come up with a forecast for future real equity returns in America of around 4% a year.
作為估計未來股票風險溢價的起點,這並不讓人歡欣鼓舞。股市目前的股息收益率(在LBS資料覆蓋的國家,股息收益率為2.7%)低於歷史平均水準。在最好的情況下,股息收益率也不如GDP增長快。通常增長緩慢是由於稀釋作用的影響。不要對市場的重新評估所帶來對股市的推動抱有太大希望。和以往相比,現在的收益率偏低,任何重新評估的推動力很可能從收益中剔除。 AQR資本管理公司(它是對沖基金公司)的Cliff Asness在另一篇文章中，利用他們對股息收益率和可能的股息增長的估計，預測出美國未來每年4%左右實際的股權回報。
Future imperfect
不太美妙的未來
Although this figure is lower than the historical average, it still means that equity investors will earn a risk premium. The real yields on short- and long-term debt are zero, or negative in some cases. Nominal yields are close to historic lows. If the risk-free return is zero, then the entire return from equities will count as a risk premium. And a 4% premium would be only a little below the long-term average for America.
儘管這一資料低於歷史平均水準，但仍意味著股票投資者能獲得風險溢價。短期或長期債券的收益率為零，或在某些情況下是負數。名義收益率接近歷史最低水準。如果無風險收益為零，那麼全部股票收益將被當作風險溢價。並且4%的溢價僅比美國歷史平均水準略低。
That still would not be high enough for many pension funds. In America, local-government pension funds base their contributions on the assumption that they will earn 8% (in nominal terms) on their investment portfolios. Treasury bonds yield 2% at the moment, so a 4% risk premium suggests a nominal return of 6% on equities. That means pension funds will fall well short of their targeted return.
對於許多養老基金來講，這4%的溢價仍不算高。在美國，當地政府養老基金是建立在他們在投資組合中將獲得8%(名義收益)的收益的假設基礎之上的。同期的國債收益為2%，因此4%的風險溢價意味著6%的股權名義回報。這就意味著養老基金遠沒達到它的目標回報。
Pension providers have two options: increase contributions or cut benefits. Cutting benefits will be difficult for many American states since pension rights are legally or constitutionally guaranteed. So taxes will have to go up or other services will have to be cut. Companies that have offered pensions linked to final salaries may have to divert money into their pension schemes, cash that could have been invested to boost the economy. Individuals who rely on private pensions (or on so-called defined-contribution benefits, where the company does not promise a payout) face the same problem.
提供養老金的人有兩種選擇：要麼增加捐款，要麼削減福利。削減福利對於大部分美國的州來講非常困難，因為養老金領取權是合法的或者受憲法保障的。所以不得不在稅收上削減或者將其它服務削減。提供與最終薪金相關的養老金的公司不得不把它們原本投資用來刺激經濟的錢轉投到養老金計畫中。依賴私人養老金的個人(或依賴所謂的養老金固定繳納計畫，而公司不承擔支付的人)面臨同樣的問題。
Equities are not a miracle asset that will turn measly contributions into a generous pension. Those who want to retire in comfort should save more.
股票不是一種可將微薄的捐款轉化成豐厚的養老金的神奇資產。那些想要在退休後頤養天年的人應該更加節儉。