IF INDIA is indeed the world’s fastest-growing big economy, as its government once again claimed this week, no one told its bankers and business leaders. In a nation of 1.3bn steadily growing at around 7% a year, the mood in corner offices ought to be jubilant. Instead, firms are busy cutting back investment as if mired in recession. Bank lending to industry, growth in which once reached 30% a year, is shrinking for the first time in over two decades. If this is world-beating growth, what might a slowdown look like?
印度政府本周再次宣告自己是全球增速最高的大型經濟體， 可印度的銀行家和企業家卻好像並不知道有此事。 在一個擁有13億人口，
India’s macroeconomy chugs along (though the quality of government statistics remains questionable), but its corporate sector is ailing. The sudden and chaotic “demonetisation” of 86% of bank notes in November hardly helped. But the origins of India’s troubles go much deeper. After India dodged the worst of the financial crisis a decade ago, a flurry of investment was made on over-optimistic assumptions. Banks have been in denial about the ability of some of their near-bankrupt borrowers to repay them. The result is that the balance-sheets of both banks and much of the corporate sector are in parlous states.
雖然官方資料疑點重重， 就這些資料來看， 印度的宏觀經濟還是走勢強勁。 不過， 相比之下印度企業卻是重病纏身。 去年11月， 印度政府突然宣佈“廢鈔”， 導致86%的流通現金作廢， 令印度經濟陷入混亂。 這自然無助於企業擺脫困境。 然而， 這些企業的麻煩還有更深的根源。 十年前， 印度僥倖躲過了全球金融危機， 過度的樂觀情緒引來了大量投資。 銀行業忽視了一些瀕臨破產的企業的還債能力。 結果是， 銀行業和諸多企業的資產負債表都陷入了危險境地。
After years of burying their heads in the sand, India’s authorities now worry that its “twin balance-sheet” problem will soon imperil the wider economy. Both the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the government have nagged banks to deal with their festering bad loans. Around $191bn-worth, or 16.6% of the entire banking system, is now “non-performing”, according to economists at Yes Bank. That number is still swelling.
而今， 多年來一直回避該問題的印度政府也終於開始擔憂即將危及整個國民經濟的“孿生資產負債表”問題了。 印度央行和政府都不斷敦促銀行業解決其日益惡化的不良貸款問題。
Given the linkages between them, companies and banks often run into trouble concurrently. But countries where banks’ balance-sheets resemble Swiss cheese usually have no choice but to deal with the issue promptly, lest a panicked public start queuing up at ATMs. India is different. State-owned lenders make up around 70% of the system, and nobody thinks the government will let them go bust. As a result, what for most economies would be an acute crisis is in India a chronic malaise.
印度的企業界與銀行業關係密切， 因而兩者常常同時陷入困境。 然而， 如果一家國銀行的資產負債表如同瑞士乳酪（“瑞士乳酪模型”指一個系統如同一摞瑞士乳酪， 每個層面的漏洞前後貫通， 形成一個通道， 令威脅能夠層層突破， 最終引發重大事故）， 那麼這個國家通常別無選擇， 只能儘快解決問題， 以免公眾陷入恐慌， 在取款機前大排場龍。 不過， 印度卻與眾不同， 印度國有銀行占銀行貸款總額的70%左右， 沒人相信政府會讓這些國有銀行破產。 因此， 在大多數經濟體內會引起突發性危機的問題在印度卻是一個慢性疾病。
That doesn’t make it any less painful. Investment is a key component of GDP, and it is now shrinking, thanks to parsimonious firms. India runs a trade deficit and the government is seeking to cut its budget shortfall, which leaves consumption as the sole engine of economic growth. Indeed, until demonetisation, consumer credit was booming, up by about 20% year on year. Some may wonder whether those are tomorrow’s bad loans, or when consumers will run out of stuff to buy.
然而， 這種差異並沒有使印度的日子好過一些。 作為GDP的關鍵部分， 印度的投資在各家企業節流的情況出現了萎縮。 印度外貿呈現逆差， 政府又在盡力削減預算赤字， 於是消費便成了經濟增長的唯一動力。 事實上， 在“廢鈔”前， 印度消費信貸增勢強勁， 同比增速約20%。 有人可能會擔心這些消費信貸會不會變成未來的壞賬， 或消費者會不會最終失去購買能力。
Meanwhile, banks’ profits are sagging, even without the impact of fully accounting for dud loans. State-owned lenders collectively are making negative returns. Thirteen of them are described in a recent finance-ministry report as “severely stressed”. Demonetisation did indeed bring in lots of fresh deposits, but the bankers were then browbeaten into slashing the rates at which they lend, further denting their margins.
另一方面， 即使不完全考慮壞賬的影響， 印度銀行業的盈利水準也低迷不振。 國有銀行借貸的總體回報率為負值。 印度財政部最近發佈的一份報告稱， 有十三家國有銀行的財務狀況“極度緊張”。 “廢鈔”確實讓銀行業得到了大量的新存款，
The dearth of investment is in part due to a lack of animal spirits. Sales outside the oil and metals sector are up by a mere 5% year on year, compared with nearer 25% at the start of the decade. Capacity utilisation, at 72.4%, is low by historical standards: even if money were available, it is not clear many would want to borrow.
投資低迷的一部分原因在於企業缺乏投資意願。 除石油和金屬業之外， 印度企業目前的銷售額增速同比只有5%， 而十年前則接近25%。 企業的開工率只有72.4%， 處於歷史低位。 也就是說， 即使銀行貸款充足， 很多企業也不願意貸款。
Bankers, companies and policymakers once hoped the twin balance-sheet problem would eventually solve itself. Everyone’s incentive has been to look away and hope economic growth cures all ills. It has not: profits are in fact shrinking at the large borrowers, many of them in the infrastructure, mining, power and telecoms sectors. But banks have cut credit across the board, including to small businesses.
印度的銀行、企業和決策層曾希望孿生資產負債表問題最終能自我化解。 所有人都寄希望於他人， 期待經濟增長能解決一切惡疾， 可是， 現實卻是貸款的大企業的盈利非但沒有回升， 反而出現下滑， 其中很多屬於基建、礦業、電力和電信部門企業。 然而， 這種情況下， 銀行卻對大小企業一視同仁， 全面削減了信貸。
Fixing this is not easy. Much of the hard work repairing corporate balance-sheets needs to be done by public-sector bank bosses, who should (yet seldom do) restructure and partly forgive loans. Many of them inherited the problems. Most defaulting tycoons are politically connected, which is how some got the loan to start with. Accepting that they cannot pay it back, and waiving part of the debt, might be seen as abetting crony capitalists. This can attract the attention of the many zealous agencies probing public spending.
解決這個難題並非易事。要修復企業資產負債表，國有銀行必須做出努力，要改革銀行結構，登出一部分貸款。可是，事實上，它們很少這樣做，反而將問題一拖再拖，得過且過。多數欠債企業的大老闆與政府關係密切，最初得到的貸款也依靠了政府關係。如果銀行承認一部分貸款難以收回並加以註銷，就可能會被視為支持裙帶資本主義，將引起諸多公共支出調查機構的注意。
So it is far easier for a banker to make no decision—which often means having to extend further loans to keep the borrower afloat—and pretend all is well. It hardly helps that one former bank boss is languishing in jail while authorities probe a loan to Kingfisher Airlines, whose former boss is skulking in a mansion in Britain.
因此，對一個銀行家來說，什麼都不做，假裝什麼都沒有發生，就是最輕鬆的選擇。這意味著進一步提升貸款額，維持貸方繼續運營。於是，以下情況也就司空見怪了：上任行長在監獄裡度日如年，有關當局在調查印度的一家航空公司翠鳥航空的一筆貸款，而後者的前任卻躲在英國某棟別墅裡逍遙快活。
Writing off loans would be easier if banks could foreclose on companies, and take equity in them instead. Many potential investors are eager to work with banks to recapitalise good companies with bad balance-sheets. But without a proper bankruptcy code, which is only now coming into force and will take years to become effective, that is a fool’s errand.
如果銀行能夠收回貸款企業的抵押贖回權，轉化為持有股份，那麼貸款就更容易清除。很多潛在投資者都迫切希望和銀行合作，調整擁有不良資產負債卻信譽良好的企業的資本組成。但若缺乏正規的相關破產規定（目前正在實施中，還需多年才能擁有真正效力），聰明人對這些資本調整都會避而遠之。
If banks help fix corporate balance-sheets, the large resulting losses will highlight how weak their own capital positions are. The government has promised to inject more money in the banks, but has put in only a small fraction of the $90bn Fitch, a ratings agency, argues they need to get onto an even keel. Nor will it countenance having less than a majority stake in the state-owned banks, limiting their ability to raise funds from private investors.
如果銀行幫助企業解決資產負債問題，那麼大額的貸款支出將會突出銀行自身資產薄弱的問題。印度政府曾承諾要向銀行注入更多資金，卻僅從900億美元中投入一小部分資金。惠譽（Fitch）評級機構認為銀行需要平穩發展，同時不支持政府在國有銀行中持有少數股權，限制其向私人投資者籌資資金的能力。
One way to break the logjam would be to set up a “bad bank” that would take the dodgiest loans off banks’ balance-sheets, leaving them free to focus on making new loans. Viral Acharya, a new deputy governor at the RBI, recently proposed ways to facilitate the transfer of non-performing loans off banks’ balance-sheets—essentially, giving cover to bankers who cut sensible deals. The government’s chief economic adviser, Arvind Subramanian, has suggested a bad bank run by the private sector.
打破僵局的方法之一就是成立一個“爛帳銀行”，專門處理其它銀行的不良資產，修復其資產負債，讓銀行能專注提供新的貸款。印度新任央行副行長阿查裡亞（Viral Acharya）近期提出幫助轉移銀行資產負債表上不良貸款的方法：說白了，就是掩護銀行抹去部分正當交易。印度首席經濟顧問阿文德·薩勃拉曼尼亞（Arvind Subramanian）建議成立一個民營的“爛帳銀行”。
Problematic as it is, at least the Indian banking sector is relatively small compared with the size of the overall economy, and its bad debts are concentrated. A database put together by Ashish Gupta at Credit Suisse, a bank, shows that over $100bn of the dud loans lie with just ten borrowers. That should simplify the co-ordination of any deal, even if the loans are spread across many banks.
儘管印度銀行業問題重重， 相比印度的整體經濟運行，銀行業所占比重較小，壞賬也很集中。根據自己整理的資料，投資銀行瑞士信貸（Credit Suisse）的阿西斯·古普塔（Ashish Gupta）表示，超過1000億的不良貸款都集中于十個貸方。這就使得借貸雙方更容易協商，即使貸款跨越諸多銀行，也比較容易達成協議。
However, the crucial element in deciding who bears the losses—setting the price at which the bad bank would buy the assets—is fiendishly difficult. What price a loan secured against a half-built bridge in Gujarat? Lots of people would have to make decisions they have expertly dodged for years. Worse, federal elections are due in 2019, and setting up bad banks takes time. Bailing out banks and tycoons would not play well at the polls. The temptation will be to give it more time—and pay a yet higher bill later.
然而，決定誰來承擔損失的關鍵，也就是決定“爛帳銀行”收買資產的定價是一項既困難又殘忍事情。比如：古吉拉突邦（Gujarat）施工一半的橋的貸款值多少錢？到時，很多人都將必須做出決定，即使他們此前曾巧妙逃避了多年。更糟的是，印度的聯邦大選將在2019年舉行，而建立“爛帳銀行”卻需要時間。可是，在競選時為銀行和企業大亨提供擔保是不討好的。到時候，這一問題又會繼續拖下去，印度也將付出更高代價。
譯者：雷琰
審校：李博文
編輯：翻吧君
Fixing this is not easy. Much of the hard work repairing corporate balance-sheets needs to be done by public-sector bank bosses, who should (yet seldom do) restructure and partly forgive loans. Many of them inherited the problems. Most defaulting tycoons are politically connected, which is how some got the loan to start with. Accepting that they cannot pay it back, and waiving part of the debt, might be seen as abetting crony capitalists. This can attract the attention of the many zealous agencies probing public spending.
解決這個難題並非易事。要修復企業資產負債表，國有銀行必須做出努力，要改革銀行結構，登出一部分貸款。可是，事實上，它們很少這樣做，反而將問題一拖再拖，得過且過。多數欠債企業的大老闆與政府關係密切，最初得到的貸款也依靠了政府關係。如果銀行承認一部分貸款難以收回並加以註銷，就可能會被視為支持裙帶資本主義，將引起諸多公共支出調查機構的注意。
So it is far easier for a banker to make no decision—which often means having to extend further loans to keep the borrower afloat—and pretend all is well. It hardly helps that one former bank boss is languishing in jail while authorities probe a loan to Kingfisher Airlines, whose former boss is skulking in a mansion in Britain.
因此，對一個銀行家來說，什麼都不做，假裝什麼都沒有發生，就是最輕鬆的選擇。這意味著進一步提升貸款額，維持貸方繼續運營。於是，以下情況也就司空見怪了：上任行長在監獄裡度日如年，有關當局在調查印度的一家航空公司翠鳥航空的一筆貸款，而後者的前任卻躲在英國某棟別墅裡逍遙快活。
Writing off loans would be easier if banks could foreclose on companies, and take equity in them instead. Many potential investors are eager to work with banks to recapitalise good companies with bad balance-sheets. But without a proper bankruptcy code, which is only now coming into force and will take years to become effective, that is a fool’s errand.
如果銀行能夠收回貸款企業的抵押贖回權，轉化為持有股份，那麼貸款就更容易清除。很多潛在投資者都迫切希望和銀行合作，調整擁有不良資產負債卻信譽良好的企業的資本組成。但若缺乏正規的相關破產規定（目前正在實施中，還需多年才能擁有真正效力），聰明人對這些資本調整都會避而遠之。
If banks help fix corporate balance-sheets, the large resulting losses will highlight how weak their own capital positions are. The government has promised to inject more money in the banks, but has put in only a small fraction of the $90bn Fitch, a ratings agency, argues they need to get onto an even keel. Nor will it countenance having less than a majority stake in the state-owned banks, limiting their ability to raise funds from private investors.
如果銀行幫助企業解決資產負債問題，那麼大額的貸款支出將會突出銀行自身資產薄弱的問題。印度政府曾承諾要向銀行注入更多資金，卻僅從900億美元中投入一小部分資金。惠譽（Fitch）評級機構認為銀行需要平穩發展，同時不支持政府在國有銀行中持有少數股權，限制其向私人投資者籌資資金的能力。
One way to break the logjam would be to set up a “bad bank” that would take the dodgiest loans off banks’ balance-sheets, leaving them free to focus on making new loans. Viral Acharya, a new deputy governor at the RBI, recently proposed ways to facilitate the transfer of non-performing loans off banks’ balance-sheets—essentially, giving cover to bankers who cut sensible deals. The government’s chief economic adviser, Arvind Subramanian, has suggested a bad bank run by the private sector.
打破僵局的方法之一就是成立一個“爛帳銀行”，專門處理其它銀行的不良資產，修復其資產負債，讓銀行能專注提供新的貸款。印度新任央行副行長阿查裡亞（Viral Acharya）近期提出幫助轉移銀行資產負債表上不良貸款的方法：說白了，就是掩護銀行抹去部分正當交易。印度首席經濟顧問阿文德·薩勃拉曼尼亞（Arvind Subramanian）建議成立一個民營的“爛帳銀行”。
Problematic as it is, at least the Indian banking sector is relatively small compared with the size of the overall economy, and its bad debts are concentrated. A database put together by Ashish Gupta at Credit Suisse, a bank, shows that over $100bn of the dud loans lie with just ten borrowers. That should simplify the co-ordination of any deal, even if the loans are spread across many banks.
儘管印度銀行業問題重重， 相比印度的整體經濟運行，銀行業所占比重較小，壞賬也很集中。根據自己整理的資料，投資銀行瑞士信貸（Credit Suisse）的阿西斯·古普塔（Ashish Gupta）表示，超過1000億的不良貸款都集中于十個貸方。這就使得借貸雙方更容易協商，即使貸款跨越諸多銀行，也比較容易達成協議。
However, the crucial element in deciding who bears the losses—setting the price at which the bad bank would buy the assets—is fiendishly difficult. What price a loan secured against a half-built bridge in Gujarat? Lots of people would have to make decisions they have expertly dodged for years. Worse, federal elections are due in 2019, and setting up bad banks takes time. Bailing out banks and tycoons would not play well at the polls. The temptation will be to give it more time—and pay a yet higher bill later.
然而，決定誰來承擔損失的關鍵，也就是決定“爛帳銀行”收買資產的定價是一項既困難又殘忍事情。比如：古吉拉突邦（Gujarat）施工一半的橋的貸款值多少錢？到時，很多人都將必須做出決定，即使他們此前曾巧妙逃避了多年。更糟的是，印度的聯邦大選將在2019年舉行，而建立“爛帳銀行”卻需要時間。可是，在競選時為銀行和企業大亨提供擔保是不討好的。到時候，這一問題又會繼續拖下去，印度也將付出更高代價。
譯者：雷琰
審校：李博文
編輯：翻吧君